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tive severance of the fruit by the contract of sale, the subject
matter would be considered personal property. As title passed at
the time of the contract to the buyer and possession remained in
the seller, a bailment was created. It was a bailment for mutual
benefit and the seller-bailee was under a duty to exercise ordi-
nary care in protecting the fruit. This duty was breached and she
should have been held liable.
Robt. A. (Dean) Carlton, Jr.
EVIDENCE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE-PEDIGREE
Arkansas. Daniel v. Johnson' was a proceeeding brought under
Arkansas Statutes, 1947 Annotated, Section 62-1301, for the
determination of heirship. The decedent was born shortly after the
Civil War and was the son of two former slaves. Testimony was
given by descendants and relatives of the intestate, and also by a
Mrs. Britt, the 96-year-old daughter of a former slave owner. Mrs.
Britt had lived her entire life in the same community with the fami-
lies involved and was well acquainted with the community reputa-
tion as to their relationships, and her memory was clear even in the
small details concerning the slaves with whom she played in her
childhood. The testimony given was hearsay concerning the family
relationships and marital relations of certain persons. The court
held that under Arkansas decisions this evidence was properly
admitted as. an exception to the hearsay rule in order to establish
pedigree.
The declarations of persons now deceased or wholly unavail-
able, who were related to the family by blood or marriage, are
generally admitted on the ground that such persons were in posi-
tion to know the truth and were free of any temptation to state
an untruth. Such declarations must have been made prior to the
beginning of the controversy in respect to which the proof is
1 _-Ark..., 226 S. W. 2d 571 (1950).
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offered. While the pedigree exception to the hearsay rule is well
established, the heavy weight of authority confines the exception
to declarations made by legal relatives and excludes those made
by non-relatives no matter how closely they may have been asso-
ciated with the family.2
In unequivocally condemning the narrow rule of the majority,
Wigmore points out that the only reasoned defense that has been
given for it is that the court would have to inquire in each instance
as to the degree of intimacy that existed between the declarant
and the family. This defense is considered to be wholly insuf-
ficient, since no court has the right to place its own convenience
ahead of its duty to investigate, so far as may be necessary. the
sources of a witness' qualifications.3
Often old servants, family physicians, or very intimate friends
are as well informed as members of the family and sometimes
more so. It is not contended that the statement ofany friend should
always be received, but it is believed that an arbitrary limitation
which excludes the statements of one whose intimacy leaves no
doubt as to his opportunity to learn the facts is unwise.4
QUALIFICATION OF EXPERT WITNESS
Louisiana. State v. Carter5 was a manslaughter case. Defend-
ant's witness, a physician, was questioned by counsel for defend-
ant as to whether or not a certain physical condition of the de-
ceased could have been caused by heart trouble. The trial court
sustained the State's objection to this question on the ground that
the witness had qualified only as a general practitioner and not
as a heart specialist. Held, refusal to allow the witness to answer
the question was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. The
supreme court said that even though specialists were available, a
general practitioner could testify as to the nature and effect of
diseases, the test being whether or not the witness was familiar
with such laws of the medical profession as bear upon the issue.
2 JONES, EvIDENcs (3rd ed. 1924) § 312.
* 5 WIcMORE, TREATISE ON EvIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1487.
4 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937) § 600.
5217 La. 547, 46 So. 2d 897 (1950).
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A physician may give opinions as to matters connected with his
profession or with medical science, although in his own practice
he may not have had experience as to such matters and although
his knowledge in respect thereto is derived only from study.6 The
liberal doctrine, favored by Wigmore, is that the law does not
require the best possible kind of a witness but only persons of
such qualifications as the community daily and reasonably relies
upon in seeking medical advice. Thus, a general practitioner may
testify on all matters as to which a regular medical training neces-
sarily involves some general knowledge.'
EXPERT TESTIMONY-INSTRUCTIONS
Oklahoma. In Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Price' decedent
died from a lung condition allegedly caused by inhaling acrid
fumes and smoke from hot coal tar enamel while he was employed
by defendant as a pipeline laborer. Physicians were introduced as
expert witnesses by both sides and gave conflicting testimony as to
whether or not the fumes could have caused the fatal lung condi-
tion. The trial court instructed the jury that they were not bound
by the testimony of any witness, expert or otherwise, and that they
were to determine the ultimate weight to be given to the testimony
of such witnesses. Defendant contended that this charge advised
the jury that they could ignore the opinions of expert witnesses.
Held, the charge did not convey such meaning as claimed by de-
fendant, and it stated no rule of law violative of defendant's righis.
The court said that the jury cannot be instructed wholly to disre-
gard the testimony of expert witnesses, but that it is not error to
instruct the jury that they may disregard such evidence if they
should deem it unreasonable or not entitled to belief because of
other and conflicting evidence from witnesses claiming positive
knowledge.
It is not uncommon for the testimony of experts to conflict, and
when such testimony consists of opinion against opinion, it is not
only proper, but necessary, that the jury know that they are free
8 JONES, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 368.
7 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 569.
8 ..------ Okla ----- _, 225 P. 2d 176 (1950).
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to disregard such expert testimony as they deem unreasonable. It
is obvious that if they are to reach any decision at all, the jury
must necessarily choose to rely upon some expert testimony and
to disregard the conflicting testimony given by other experts. The
jury may not, of course, be instructed to disregard certain expert
testimony, but it is not error to instruct them that they may disre-
gard such evidence as they deem unreasonable.9
SCIENTIFIC TESTING DEVICES
Texas. McKay v. State1" was a driving-while-intoxicated case.
On the trial the State first introduced in evidence the results of a
breath test made with defendant's consent at the time of his arrest,
and then introduced, as an expert witness, a research biochemist
who testified that from the results of the breath test he would say
defendant was intoxicated. This witness testified that the testing
instrument was accurate but admitted that there was disagreement
among scientists as to its accuracy. Defendant contended that such
disagreement would preclude the introduction in evidence of the
results of such a test. Held, defendant's objection went to the
weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.
Use of scientific instruments always involves to some extent a
dependence upon the statements of other persons. It is not feasible
for the scientist to test every instrument personally, and, further-
more, he finds that from a practical standpoint the standard meth-
ods are sufficiently dependable to be trusted.11 What is needed in
,order to justify testimony based on scientific instruments is pre-
liminary professional testimony as to the trustworthiness of the
process or instrument in general, and as to the correctness of the
particular instrument.' 2 To refuse to recognize generally accepted
:scientific conclusions would be contrary to the modem tendency,
which is to receive whatever light can be thrown upon the issue by
competent persons and then leave their credit to the jury. 3
9 JONFS, Op. cit. § 392.
10 ------------ Tex. Crim Rep -------------- 235 S. W. 2d 173 (1950).
112 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 665a.
12 3 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 795.
18a 2 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 662.
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There are few scientific theories on which scientists are in com-
plete accord, and the fact that they disagree as to the merits of a
particular test for intoxication should not be sufficient reason to
exclude entirely the results of such a test from the consideration
of the jury. The fact that the test is not highly regarded by some
members of the scientific profession is a circumstance that should
affect the weight to be given by the jury to such a test, but is not
such a circumstance as to render the test inadmissible as evidence.
In another driving-while-intoxicated case, House v. State,1 4 the
State introduced in evidence the results of a chemist's analysis of
a specimen of urine voluntarily given by defendant at the time
of his arrest. The chemist testified without objection as to the per-
centage of alcohol contained in the specimen. The State's next
witness, a physician who was not a chemist, then testified that from
reading and study and from certain documents relative to such
matters, he was of the opinion that the percentage of alcohol shown
by the chemical analysis was evidence that the giver of the speci-
men was intoxicated. Defendant objected to the physician's testi-
mony as hearsay and a conclusion of the witness. Held, defendant's
objection went to the weight rather than to the admissibility of the
testimony.
The person offered as an expert witness must possess special
knowledge as to the very matter on which he proposes to give an
opinion, but this knowledge may have been obtained entirely from
study of technical works.'" The fact that his information as to the
particular matter is based in whole or in part upon hearsay state-
ments of his fellow practitioners or of medical books should make
no difference.'" A doctor must necessarily gain a great deal of his
information from sources other than personal experience. It is the
special knowledge acquired, not the manner of acquiring it, that
makes him an expert witness. The source of his knowledge may
properly affect the weight of his testimony but not its admissibility.
It is felt that the holdings in the McKay and House cases will
14 ---------- Tex. Crim. Rep ............. 233 S. W. 2d 862 (1950).
15 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. supra note 4, § 633, p. 798, n. 73.
16 Id. § 643, p. 818, n. 91.
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tend to broaden the scope of evidence which may be introduced by
allowing the results of scientific tests to be offered in testimony and
permitting experts to interpret them, while reserving to the jury the
right to pass on the weight to be given both to the tests themselves
and to the interpretation placed upon the results by the experts.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Texas. Thomas v. State7 was a driving-while-intoxicated case.
On the trial a policeman testified that he could tell that defendant
was intoxicated by the way he acted, adding, "Yes, I had him to
walk." Defendant objected that forcing him to walk violated his
constitutional rights in that it compelled him to produce evidence
against himself. Held, the conviction should be affirmed. The court
remarked that the record was silent as to when and where the
policeman had defendant walk, as to what the result of the walk-
ing was, and as to whether or not such walking was the basis for
the officer's conclusion that defendant was drunk. The court added
that unless arrested in his cell, a man would ordinarily have to do
some walking and that there is no reason why an officer who ob-
served such walking should not be permitted to testify as to the
results.
Most of the cases dealing with self-incrimination have involved
requiring the defendant to perform a physical act before the jury.
For example, the accused may be required to stand up for iden-
tification, or to give a specimen of his handwriting." Inspection
of bodily features does not violate the privilege, because the ac-
cused is not made a witness. He may be required to exercise mus-
cular action, as to roll up his sleeve or to take off his shoe, because
it is testimonial compulsion, not compulsion alone, that is the
essential idea of the privilege. Unless some attempt is made to
secure from defendant a communciation, written or oral, which is
to be relied upon as his conscious recitation of fact, the demand
made upon him is not a testimonial one. 19 In recent times the privi-
17 .----------- Tex. Crim. Rep ............. 227 S. W. 2d 810 (1950).
18 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. § 203.
19 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. § 2265.
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lege against self-incrimination has been subjected to numerous
abuses. So long as constitutional and statutory sanction is given to
the privilege, it cannot be abandoned, but since the only substantial
reasons for it have long since ceased to exist, it is well for our
courts to confine it within the narrowest possible limits."0
CHARACTER WITNESSES
Texas. The defendant in Baker v. State,21 having pleaded for a
suspended sentence in a prosecution for rape, introduced several
character witnesses. Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor ques-
tioned defendant's witnesses as to their personal knowledge of
certain prior occasions upon which (according to the prosecutor)
defendant had been arrested for drunkenness. Over defendant's
objections the witnesses were required to answer. Held, the judg-
ment should be reversed and remanded for the reason that the
cross-examination was directed not at showing defendant's repu-
tation but at showing defendant's character, i.e., showing the wit-
nesses' personal knowledge of defendant's conduct. Since only the
reputation of defendant was in issue, and not his character, the
cross-examination was not admissible.
This holding follows the well-established rule in Texas that
character witnesses may give evidence only as to the general repu-
tation of the accused. By filing application for a suspended sen-
tence defendant puts in issue his reputation, thus enabling the
State to show his bad reputation as a part of its case. "Reputa-
tion," as used in Article 778 of the Texas Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Vernon, 1948), is held to mean reputation as a peaceable,
law-abiding citizen, and the State is not permitted to inquire into
specific conduct or specific character traits.22
Since Article 778 says nothing about character, the defendant
who seeks a suspended sentence does not put his character in issue.
As made admirably clear in McNaulty v. State,2" there is no neces-
sary correlation between one's reputation and one's character-
20 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. § 193.
21 ----------- Tex. Crim. Rep -------------- 230 S. W . 2d 219 (1950).
22 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. § 681, p. 877.
23 138 Tex. Crim. Rep. 317, 321, 135 S. W. 2d 987, 989 (1940).
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character being that which one actually is and does, and reputa-
tion being that which others think and say about him. To admit
testimony of a witness' personal knowledge of specific acts of de-
fendant's misconduct would be to admit evidence as to a matter
not in issue, i.e., defendant's character. According to the McNauty
case, cited with complete approval by the court in the Baker case,
the exact rule is that a witness may tell what he has heard about
defendant's reputation but may not tell what he knows about the
facts which may have gone to make up such reputation.
While no one would seriously dispute that evidence of defend-
ant's specific acts of misconduct would frequently be of great
value to the jury in suspended sentence cases, nevertheless the
dangers of undue prejudice, unfair surprise, and confusion of
minor issues with the main issue tip the scales heavily in favor
of ruling out all such testimony. The sound reasons of policy
behind the absolute exclusion of testimony regarding specific con-
duct where reputation is the issue are well set forth in Wigmore24
and in McCormick and Ray.25
EXPERT TESTIMONY TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE
Texas. In Kelly vi McKay2" plaintiff sought an injunction and
sued to recover for extensive damages to his home allegedly caused
by use of explosives in defendant's nearby caliche pit. Plaintiff's
witness, after qualifying as an expert, was permitted over defend-
ant's objection to testify that he had examined the rock formation
on which plaintiff's house rested as well as the topography of the
land between the caliche pit and plaintiff's premises; that in his
opinion 100 to 150 pounds of explosives would be necessary to
cause rock tremors at the distance of plaintiff's house from the
caliche pit; that he had never found so much explosive necessary
to quarry gravel or caliche under reasonable conditions; and that
in his opinion there would be no need to use a blast of 150 pounds
of explosive in excavating a gravel pit. The trial court instructed
a verdict for defendant and rendered judgment denying plaintiff
24 3 WIGMORF, op. cit. § 988, pp. 619, 624.
25 MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. § 672, p. 862.
26 __.------- Tex -------------- 233 S. W. 2d 121 (1950).
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